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About this Policy Brief
In the past decade climate change has become one 
of the world’s biggest public policy issues. Ten years 
ago no one would have predicted that the Nobel 
Peace prize would be awarded to 10,000 or so climate 
scientists (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change) and a populariser (Al Gore) of its possible 
impacts. In this Policy Brief three contributors examine 
the policy issues of climate change from a global 
(Will Steffen), regional (Luca Tacconi) and a national 
perspective (Frank Jotzo). Collectively, they offer a 
range of insights that will be of use to policymakers 
and all those interested in the climate-public policy 
dimension. 
R. Quentin Grafton
Research Director
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Basic science
The basic science of climate change is well understood. 
One of the most important features of the climate 
system is the role in the atmosphere of greenhouse 
gases: water vapour, carbon dioxide (CO2), methane, 
nitrous oxide and others. These gases—which are 
constituents of the atmosphere naturally—change 
the energy balance at the Earth’s surface by absorbing 
outgoing long-wave radiation (heat) and re-emitting it, 
some of which returns to the Earth’s surface and warms 
it. This natural greenhouse effect is so important that 
without these gases, the surface of the Earth would be 
33ºC colder than it was in pre-industrial times. That 
is, the Earth would be permanently frozen and life 
would not exist.
Since the onset of the Industrial Revolution, humans 
have been increasing significantly the concentrations 
of several greenhouse gases—the most notable of 
which is CO2. Not surprisingly, this has changed the 
energy balance at the Earth’s surface; the net effect, 
of course, should be a warming climate. That the 
Earth is now warming rapidly is unequivocal. There 
is very strong evidence that the observed warming 
trend since the middle of last century is due primarily 
to anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions and is 
beyond natural variability (IPCC 2007).
The changing energy balance at the Earth’s surface 
is leading to many other large-scale—continent 
or ocean basin—changes in climate, in addition to 
temperature changes. These include changes in wind 
patterns—particularly the movement of the mid-
latitude westerlies in both hemispheres towards the 
poles; decreases in ocean salinity in some basins; 
decreases in the thickness and extent of Arctic sea 
ice; increasing dynamic instability of ice sheets—
particularly in Greenland and possibly west Antarctica; 
and increases in extreme weather events, including 
heat waves and floods (IPCC 2007).  
Potential impacts for Australia
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC 2007) has summarised clearly the basic changes 
in the climate system that have direct implications in 
terms of impacts and consequences.
It is very likely that heat extremes, heat waves and 
heavy precipitation events will continue to become 
more frequent.
The number of tropical cyclones each year is 
projected to decrease, but their intensity is expected 
to increase, with larger peak wind speeds and more 
intense precipitation.
Storm tracks are projected to move towards 
the poles, with consequent changes in wind, 
precipitation and temperature patterns outside 
the tropics.
Dynamical (ice-sheet) processes are not included 
in current models but recent observations suggest 
they could increase the vulnerability of the ice 
sheets to warming, increasing future sea-level rise. 
Understanding of these processes is limited and 
there is no consensus on their magnitude.
Many impacts are now discernible globally, as well 
as in Australia. For example, the European heat wave 
of August 2003—which led to about 35,000 premature 
deaths—was made about three times more probable 
by the underlying increase in mean temperature. A 
similar heat wave was experienced in eastern Australia 
in February 2004. Although the Australian heat wave 
did not lead to a significant increase in deaths, it did 
put considerable pressure on health services; for 
example, it led to the largest ambulance call-out ever 
recorded in southeast Queensland (Steffen, Love and 
Whetton 2006).
In terms of biodiversity, coral reefs are among the 
most threatened ecosystems in the world. Not only 
•
•
•
•
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are they increasingly prone to coral-bleaching events 
as sea-surface temperatures rise, the increase in ocean 
acidity due to increasing dissolution of CO2 from the 
atmosphere adds a further, interacting stress. Although 
reefs can recover from isolated bleaching events, 
shorter intervals between events and more severe 
events will lead eventually to a transition from a coral-
dominated to an algae-dominated ecosystem. The latter 
is far less diverse and is unattractive from an aesthetic 
and tourism perspective. Good management—such as 
that for Australia’s Great Barrier Reef—can forestall 
the loss of the coral ecosystem; it cannot avoid such a 
transition if CO2 emissions are not reduced sharply by 
the middle of the century, at the latest.
Changes to the water cycle driven by climate 
change are among the most severe facing Australian 
society. Already a 15 per cent reduction in rainfall 
in southwestern Western Australia has led to a 50 
per cent reduction in stream flows into the Perth 
water-supply dams, which has prompted the city to 
develop alternative—and more costly—approaches 
to water supply. The 50-year drying trend in eastern 
Australia appears to have intensified in the past 
decade, threatening the water supplies of all major 
east coast cities and greatly reducing the amount of 
water available for irrigated agriculture. Although 
the links between these drying trends and climate 
change have not been proven conclusively, there is 
a growing risk that there is a connection. Probably 
more than any other aspect of climate, the recent 
drought and more long-term drying trends have 
focused attention on the current and potential 
consequences of climate change for the well-being 
of the country.   
What constitutes ‘dangerous climate change’ in 
terms of impacts and consequences is developing 
rapidly into a vigorous global debate (for example, 
Schellnhuber et al. 2006). Although scientific research 
into the nature of climate impacts can inform the 
debate, deciding what is really dangerous in terms of 
climate change is very much an individual and societal 
value judgement—and can vary markedly around the 
world. For example, the inhabitants of low-lying Pacific 
island states have already decided that the current level 
of climate change (a global mean temperature rise of 
about 0.7ºC) is dangerous and they are leaving their 
countries in large numbers for New Zealand. On the 
other hand, Russia could benefit in many ways from 
further warming: agriculture could move northwards, 
the country’s vast boreal forests could expand into the 
present tundra regions and large deposits of oil and 
gas in the Arctic Ocean could become accessible as the 
sea ice retreats. A large number of interpretations of 
‘dangerous climate change’ lie in between these two 
extremes, but the point is that societal judgements 
of what is dangerous will vary widely around the 
world—adding another layer of complexity to the 
task of building a global governance system to control 
climate change.
Policy challenges
The growing discussion of what constitutes dangerous 
climate change and economic analyses such as the 
Stern review (2007) have sharpened the policy debate 
surrounding climate change. Climate change is not just 
another environmental issue; it is, in fact, a challenge 
that goes to the heart of modern civilisation and our 
relationship with our own life-support system. One of 
the most complex aspects of devising effective policies 
to deal with climate change—on a national and a global 
scale—is that the biophysical characteristics of the 
climate system correlate poorly with the time scales, 
assumptions and values/ethics of contemporary 
policy processes. Below, three such aspects of the 
climate-policy system are described briefly.
Equity issues 
Equity issues—focused sharply on the divide between 
industrialised and developing countries—cloud the 
international debate on climate change. Because CO2 
is a non-reactive gas and therefore has a long lifetime 
in the atmosphere (it will take many centuries for the 
atmospheric concentration of CO2 to return to pre-
industrial levels after human emissions are reduced 
to nearly zero), historic emissions play an important 
role in observed and future climate change. This 
basic fact has been obscured recently by the focus 
on China and India as future large emitters. By far, 
most of the additional CO2 in the atmosphere now 
has come from the industrialised world—led by the 
United States, Europe and Japan. On the other hand, 
the most severe consequences of climate change 
will be borne disproportionately by the developing 
world—exacerbated by the lower adaptive capacity in 
developing countries. The equity issue is complicated 
by the ways in which various countries quantify their 
contribution to a global problem. For example, we in 
Australia—with only 20 million inhabitants—often 
argue that our emissions are a very small fraction of 
the global total, and are already dwarfed by China’s 
emissions. Measured on a per capita basis, however, 
our emissions are about equal to those of the United 
States—the highest on the planet—and much higher 
than China’s per capita emissions. The equity issue 
can be summarised as two fundamental questions: 
should the assignment of emission reduction targets in 
any global scheme be decided by aggregates based on 
national jurisdictions, or should every human being—
regardless of the country in which they live—have the 
same right to the ‘atmospheric sink’? How should the 
historical pattern of CO2 emissions be factored into 
emission reduction schemes of the future?  
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Mismatch in time scales 
The very long—from a human perspective—time 
scales associated with the climate system present 
unusual challenges to the policy process. This is 
displayed best visually in Figure 1, which shows 
various projections of climate change—using global 
mean temperature as an indicator—for 2020–29 and 
2090–99 (IPCC 2007). The challenge for the policy 
process is that no matter how vigorously we reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions in the next two decades, it 
will have virtually no effect on the extent of climate 
change that we experience during this period. Part 
of the reason for this is the momentum built into the 
climate system—due largely to the thermal inertia in 
the oceans and the cryosphere—which implies that 
we are committed to another 0.5ºC or 0.6ºC of global 
mean temperature rise regardless of human action. 
What government can convince its electorate to make 
possibly significant sacrifices now with no perceptible 
effect for 25 years? 
There are, however, even longer lags in the climate 
system to deal with. If temperatures rise to 2.5ºC or 
3ºC above pre-industrial levels, it is highly likely that 
most of the Greenland ice sheet and parts of the west 
Antarctic ice sheet will melt—leading to an eventual 
sea-level rise of about six metres. How long it will take 
to reach this new sea level is uncertain—with estimates 
ranging from about only 100 years to a millennium 
or longer. What is certain, however, is that once this 
tipping point is reached, there is no going back, even 
if we could reduce greenhouse gas emissions to zero 
overnight.    
Figure 1  Multi-model mean of annual mean surface air temperature change, 2020–29 and 2090–99  
(degrees Celsius) 
Note: Figures are for the scenarios B1 (top), A1B (middle) and A2 (bottom). Anomalies are relative to the average of the period 1980–99.  
Source: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 2007. Working Group 1 Report: the science of climate change, Cambridge 
University Press, Massachusetts.
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Thresholds, abrupt changes, non-linear effects and 
irreversible changes 
From the perspective of the policy debate, one of the 
most misunderstood—or even ignored—characteristics 
of the climate system is that it is highly non-linear 
and is prone to abrupt changes, threshold effects 
and irreversible changes (in a human time frame) 
(for example, Hansen et al. 2007). As in any complex 
system, very small changes in a forcing factor can 
trigger surprisingly large and sometimes catastrophic 
changes in a system. In the case of climate, very small, 
incremental increases of just a few parts per million in 
atmospheric CO2 concentration could tip the climate 
system into a cascade of feedbacks that would propel 
the Earth into a different climatic and environmental 
state. Examples include the rapid disintegration of 
the large ice sheets on Greenland and Antarctica or 
large-scale and uncontrollable feedbacks in the carbon 
cycle: activation of methane clathrates buried under 
the coastal seas, the rapid loss of methane from warmer 
and drier tundra ecosystems, increasing wildfires in 
the boreal and tropical zones, the conversion of the 
Amazon rainforest to a savannah and the release of 
CO2 from warming soils. Once a critical threshold was 
crossed and such a series of processes was triggered, 
no policy or management approaches could slow or 
reverse the process. In an indirect way, therefore, CO2 
is very much a ‘threshold gas’ from the perspective of 
the climate system.
Threshold/feedback processes raise the issue 
of ‘overshoot’. This refers to the possibility that, on 
the way to an overall emission reduction target by 
2050, interim targets along the way might be relaxed 
for economic reasons, leading to an overshoot in 
atmospheric CO2 concentration. This could lead to a 
threshold concentration of CO2 to be crossed, activating 
the natural feedbacks described above and therefore 
rendering the original target impossible (Figure 2). The 
bottom line for policy is that not only is an ultimate 
target CO2 concentration based on the biophysics of 
the climate system critical, the pathway to that target is 
just as important as the ultimate target itself. This raises 
the most difficult question that climate policymakers 
will face: what is the appropriate trade-off between 
the costs of mitigating climate change and the risk 
that crossing a critical CO2 concentration threshold 
could have catastrophic consequences for modern 
civilisation? 
Figure 2 Risks posed by the ‘overshoot’ phenomenon 
Notes: Stabilisation scenario A (green line) aims for a target atmospheric CO2 concentration via an emission pathway that never allows 
the interim CO2 concentration to rise above the final target value. Stabilisation scenario B (red line) follows an emission pathway that 
relaxes the interim targets to allow higher emissions in the near term, allowing the CO2 concentration to rise above the final target value 
before dropping later towards the target (broken red line). The interim CO2 concentration, however, rises above a biophysical threshold 
value, activating strong feedback processes that accelerate natural emissions of CO2—and methane—from the land and the oceans. This 
trajectory (rising solid red line) is now out of policy or management control and will likely lead to dangerous climate change by almost 
any definition. 
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Deforestation is a significant source of 
greenhouse gas emissions
Land-use change and forestry contribute 17 per 
cent of total greenhouse gas emissions—the third 
largest contribution after energy supply (26 per cent) 
and industry (19 per cent) (IPCC 2007). Most of the 
emissions from land-use change and forestry originate 
from deforestation, which means the permanent 
removal of forest. Forest degradation also contributes 
to emissions. There is very limited information on the 
extent of degradation for most countries; therefore, 
this paper focuses on deforestation.
Deforestation occurs mostly in tropical, low-
income countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America. A 
notable exception was Australia, which was the only 
industrialised country among the top 20 deforesting 
countries in the period 2000–05 (Table 1). These countries 
account for almost 80 per cent of global deforestation. 
The need to reduce deforestation has been stressed 
by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC 2007) and the Stern review (2006). Australia has 
also recognised the need to reduce deforestation—at 
least in developing countries. In March 2007, the 
Prime Minister, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and 
the Minister of Environment and Water Resources 
announced the A$200 million Global Initiative on 
Forests and Climate. The objective of the initiative is 
to facilitate significant and cost-effective reductions 
in greenhouse gas emissions in developing countries 
through reductions in deforestation and by encouraging 
reforestation and the promotion of sustainable forest 
management.
The causes of deforestation
The causes of deforestation have to be understood to 
estimate accurately how much it will cost to reduce it 
and whether financial incentives will be sufficient to 
achieve the objective. 
Given the significance of deforestation, it might be 
surprising that in most countries there is considerable 
uncertainty about the current causes. Historically, 
deforestation was driven by the expansion of 
agriculture into forested land, the use of timber for 
energy production and, to a lesser extent, logging 
to supply timber products (Williams 2003). This 
trend appears to have continued in recent decades. 
Recent global reviews have derived conclusions 
about the causes of deforestation from surveys of 
other country-level studies that were carried out at 
different times and which did not cover large areas of 
the countries studied. These global reviews are useful 
as they provide an indication of the potential causes 
of deforestation that need to be researched further. It 
is not clear, however, to what extent they have been 
able to pinpoint accurately the causes of deforestation 
that are relevant to the most significant deforesting 
countries. 
Recent studies of deforestation add corruption 
and illegal logging to the causes mentioned above. 
These are new findings and they need to be tested. 
They highlight, however, that deforestation involves 
complex relationships and a number of stakeholders, 
whose interests have to be considered. It is not simply a 
matter of providing economic incentives to countries—
for instance, through a carbon market—to entice some 
of those stakeholders to reduce deforestation. We will 
return to governance issues later. Let us now consider 
the cost of avoiding deforestation.
The cost of avoiding deforestation
The Stern review (2006) reported that the cost 
of avoiding deforestation—in terms of forgone 
agricultural production—amounted to US$5 billion 
a year. This is an approximate estimate because there 
is limited quantitative information on the costs and 
benefits of alternative land uses and mitigation options 
(IPCC 2007). This paucity of information leads to 
Deforestation and climate change
Luca Tacconi
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questions about the amount of financial resources 
required to avoid deforestation.
The background study prepared for the Stern review 
by Maryanne Grieg-Gran (IIED 2006) estimated the 
cost of avoiding deforestation by assessing the benefits 
from agricultural activities that a country would have 
to forgo. The rationale of this approach is that forests 
are cleared to enable the expansion of agricultural 
activities. If, in order to conserve the forest, agricultural 
activities were not allowed to take place, the country 
would forgo the benefits that would have been derived 
from those activities. Given that deforesting countries 
are normally developing countries, they cannot afford 
to forgo those benefits and should therefore receive 
financial compensation. 
IIED (2006) reviewed studies that had assessed 
the returns of various agricultural activities in eight 
countries—including the five highlighted in Table 
1—that accounted for about 48 per cent of global 
deforestation during the period 2000–05. The cost of 
avoiding deforestation in those countries was found to 
range between US$3 billion and US$6.5 billion a year. A 
scenario resulting in costs of up to US$11 billion a year 
was also identified. The cost estimate of US$5 billion 
a year—reported in the Stern review—was identified 
as a medium-level scenario.
The cost of avoiding deforestation could be 
significantly higher than the above estimates. For 
instance, according to this author ’s assessment, 
oil-palm cultivation in Indonesia—which in IIED 
(2006) is assumed to account for about 30 per cent of 
deforestation in that country—is currently generating 
financial benefits that are about twice as high as those 
assumed in the study. Ironically, the increase in the 
returns from oil-palm cultivation is the result of a 
surge in the price of palm oil, which is due partly to 
increased global demand for bio-fuels—palm oil being 
one of them. 
The economic implications of avoiding deforestation 
are broader than the costs just discussed. First, the 
impacts on the economy of a reduction in the expansion 
of agricultural activities are broader than just forgone 
land-use change benefits. For example, if—in order to 
avoid deforestation—oil-palm plantations cannot be 
established, other economic activities will be impacted: 
palm-oil mills will not be built and construction 
companies will have less work. Second, there will 
be social impacts. Continuing with the example of 
reduced expansion of oil-palm plantations, plantation 
and mill workers and construction workers would 
not have employment—at least in those businesses. If 
the unemployment and underemployment rates are 
high—as is the case in many deforesting countries—
these workers might not be able to find alternative 
employment. These issues need to be addressed to 
formulate a comprehensive assessment of the social 
and economic costs of avoiding deforestation and to 
formulate appropriate policies.
Development challenges
Deforestation is associated with productive activities 
such as agriculture and the extraction of timber; 
therefore, we need to ask: where will the products that 
would otherwise have been derived from deforested 
areas come from? 
A first option is that productive activities could shift 
from the area targeted for forest conservation to other 
areas within the same country. The outcome would be 
a similar amount of deforestation. A second option is 
that productive activities shift from the country that 
reduces deforestation to other countries, which in turn 
deforest more. Again, there would be no net reduction 
in deforestation. A third option is that unused 
and deforested areas—in the country that reduces 
deforestation or in other countries—are brought under 
production. A fourth option is that existing producers 
become more efficient and produce more goods. The 
third and fourth options would allow avoidance of 
deforestation while providing the required goods. The 
real outcome of efforts aimed at avoiding deforestation 
would probably involve a mix of the above options. It 
would most likely also involve changes in the price of 
goods—which, for simplicity, has not been considered. 
These examples highlight, however, that activities 
aimed at avoiding deforestation will have significant 
development implications for the target countries 
as well as other countries—including industrialised 
countries.
Industrialised countries need to support 
deforesting countries to address these development 
challenges. Avoiding deforestation is not simply an 
issue of providing compensation for forgone land 
development. 
Governance challenges
Many deforesting countries present very challenging 
governance conditions (Table 1). Only five of the top 
20 deforesting countries are classified as ‘free’—that 
is, they have functioning democracies. The other 
countries have outright dictatorships or democratic 
systems that are not functioning well. All the countries 
listed—with the exception of Australia—have high 
levels of corruption. Myanmar is perceived to be the 
most corrupt country in the world and it is ranked 
one hundred and seventy-ninth, a position shared 
with Somalia. Brazil and Mexico are ranked seventy-
second—the best ranked among the top 20 deforesting 
countries apart from Australia—but they still have 
high corruption indices. Five of the top 20 countries are 
considered to be failed states as defined by the index 
that assesses social, economic, political-military and 
institutional conditions.
The contribution of governance conditions to 
deforestation is uncertain, as already noted. These same 
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conditions, however, present significant challenges to 
initiatives aimed at reducing deforestation through 
the provision of financial incentives as well as to 
addressing the development changes highlighted 
above. 
Many states claim ownership of significant shares of 
the forest estate (Table 1). This implies that the country 
could also claim the right to financial incentives 
received from other governments—or through carbon 
markets—to reduce deforestation. In many cases, 
however, local communities who claim traditional 
rights to forested land dispute the State’s ownership 
of it. In those situations, deforestation for agricultural 
purposes would most likely continue, unless those 
communities were involved in the protection of 
forests and received financial benefits or alternative 
development opportunities.
High levels of corruption imply that the financial 
incentive schemes designed to reduce deforestation 
will face significant management challenges with a 
high risk of failure and high transaction costs. High 
levels of corruption are associated also with the 
capture of large forest areas by government officials 
and their associates. They would lose access to forest 
resources if those financial incentive mechanisms were 
put in place—unless of course they could capture 
the financial benefits arising from the same incentive 
schemes.
Failed states present difficult security environments 
in addition to the challenges of high corruption levels. 
Significant security problems make it either impossible 
to establish activities aimed at avoiding deforestation 
or lead to their failure.
Recommendations
Deforestation contributes a significant share of 
greenhouse gas emissions and it needs to be reduced. 
Governments have to address several issues to achieve 
this objective.
First, the information gap on the costs and benefits 
of alternative land uses has to be filled. Governments 
should support research on this issue to allow 
comparable analyses in Africa, Asia and Latin America. 
This research should consider also the broader social 
and economic costs of avoiding deforestation.
Second, governments should support the inclusion 
of deforestation and forest degradation prevention in 
the successor to the Kyoto Protocol in order to create a 
market for carbon credits from these activities. Direct 
support from industrialised to developing countries 
will not be sufficient to cover the cost of avoiding 
deforestation. Even a lower end of the spectrum 
cost of US$10 billion amounts to almost 10 per cent 
of global development assistance provided in 2006 
(OECD 2007). 
Third, donor countries should consider support 
for forest governance reforms when they support 
governance initiatives. This support would increase 
the likelihood of success of deforestation prevention 
activities.
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Australia is set to introduce greenhouse gas emission 
trading, with both major political parties now 
committed to implementing a national scheme. The 
Prime Ministerial Task Group on Emissions Trading 
(2007) and the states’ National Emissions Trading 
Taskforce (2006) developed the initial proposals (see 
ANU Institute for Environment 2007). While the 
framework is beginning to take shape, much debate 
remains about the design, what targets are to be set 
and the relationship of Australian emission trading 
to climate policy internationally. 
Emission pricing is seen as the primary policy 
instrument to cut greenhouse gas emissions cost 
effectively, as it can deliver a pervasive signal to invest 
in cleaner technologies and to change production 
practices and consumption patterns. Specific measures 
to support the development of low-carbon technologies 
can play their role alongside emission pricing if they 
correct a specific additional market failure, such as 
spill-overs in innovation.
Emission trading requires the regulator putting 
a cap on total emissions, issuing permits and letting 
emitters trade those permits (‘cap and trade’). Price-
based emission control instruments such as emission 
taxes would be superior in dealing with cost uncertainty, 
but emission trading has strong political attraction, 
including being able to define the quantitative outcome 
from the policy and to channel resources easily to 
emitters by allocating them free permits. 
Greenhouse gas emission trading is already in 
operation on a large scale in the European Union. 
Another scheme is to start in the northeastern states 
of the United States—the Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative—and various other schemes around the 
world are in planning or preparation. 
Allocating the permits
Imposing a greenhouse gas constraint with emission 
trading means creating a new commodity: emission 
permits. The total value of these permits can be 
very large. To illustrate, if permits were issued in 
Australia for 400 million tonnes of CO2-equivalent per 
annum—roughly the current level of energy-related 
emissions—and permits were traded at, say, A$25 per 
tonne (EU permits were traded at about €22/tonne 
in October 2007), then the total value of Australian 
permits would be A$10 billion per annum, or about 1 
per cent of gross domestic product (GDP). 
The prime minister ’s task group proposed 
covering practically all of Australia’s energy and 
transport emissions through a combination of direct 
(‘downstream’) liability for large emitters and an 
upstream system covering small emitters—for example, 
permits at the wholesale fuel distribution level rather 
than for fuel use in cars and by households. The states’ 
initial proposal covers only large energy-sector emitters, 
but extending the coverage is now being considered. 
Who should receive the newly created permit 
wealth? Users of energy and energy-intensive goods 
and services ultimately face the bill in the form 
of higher prices. Existing high-emission capital 
equipment such as coal-fired power plants will lose 
value, and producers of traded energy-intensive goods 
such as aluminium and steel will find themselves at a 
disadvantage vis-à-vis competitors in countries where 
there is no carbon pricing. 
‘Grandfathering’—in which governments hand out 
free permits to existing emitters in proportion to their 
past emissions—can give emitters large windfall profits, 
because most emitters pass on some of their extra costs 
(for permits or abatement measures) to their customers 
in the form of higher prices. For example, if power 
plants receive their permits for free, their net operating 
costs remain roughly the same, but the price fetched in 
the market goes up, and profits rise. In the European 
Union—where most permits are grandfathered—such 
windfall profits have been estimated in the order of 
several billion euros a year. 
The preferred allocation method from an economic 
viewpoint is auctioning. If no permits are given away 
freely, there is no costly lobbying for free permits and 
no incentives for firms to distort their behaviour to 
reap more free permits. Auctioning generates revenue, 
which can be used to lower existing taxes or to finance 
public spending—including on climate change-related 
programs. From an equity viewpoint, arguments in 
favour of full auctioning are that policy changes are 
a normal business risk, that some form of carbon 
pricing has been expected for many years and that 
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compensation would be due primarily to consumers. 
Developments in the United States show that permit 
allocation by auctioning is feasible politically: under 
the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, several states 
are planning to auction 100 per cent of their permits.
The prime minister’s task group acknowledged the 
theoretical superiority of auctioning, but recommended 
a mixed system of giving free permits to some emitters 
and auctioning the rest. The proposal is to compensate 
emitters that face a ‘disproportionate burden’ in the 
loss in value of their assets through a one-off allocation 
of permits of different vintages, including for future 
years. Similarly, the states’ blueprint foresees upfront 
free allocations to electricity generators to compensate 
them for negative effects on their profitability. 
The compensatory approach has an obvious political 
attraction in that it could buy out industry interests in a 
one-off manner. It would, however, base huge financial 
transfers on contestable modelling. The computation of 
free permits would require estimating economy-wide 
costs and firm-level changes decades into the future, 
and would rely on debatable assumptions about future 
energy prices, production technologies, emissions 
targets, permit prices and so forth. 
Carbon leakage
The fear of ‘carbon leakage’—namely that producers 
of energy-intensive traded goods such as aluminium 
and steel might shift production to countries where 
emissions are not priced—has been a strong impediment 
to emission pricing in Australia. 
The approach in the states’ and the federal 
government’s proposals is compensation: firms that are 
emission intensive and trade exposed would receive 
free permits to cover the direct and indirect carbon 
costs they faced. Down the track, free permits would 
be allocated on the basis of best-practice benchmarks 
rather than real emissions, and free allocation would 
cease if and when international competitors were 
subject to similar carbon costs. 
The compensation approach has the advantage that 
trade-exposed firms would face similar incentives as other 
emitters to use more efficient technology and practices. 
The prices of traded, emissions-intensive products in 
Australia would, however, not reflect the carbon price, 
so there would be no price incentives to substitute high-
emission for low-emission materials—for example, 
opting for timber rather than steel in construction.
The main alternative in the discussion is border tax 
adjustments. Production for export would be exempted 
from the carbon price and any imports might be taxed 
for their carbon content. It has been argued that border 
taxes would be difficult to implement, particularly for 
imports. Then again, such adjustments would likely 
need to apply only to a small number of industries and 
firms engaged in exports. 
Targets
To limit the risk of dangerous climate change, global 
greenhouse gas emissions will have to be reduced 
drastically in coming decades (see paper by Will 
Steffen in this policy brief). What levels of emissions 
and risk are acceptable is ultimately a question 
of societal choice. Proposals in the international 
discussion are for reductions of 50 per cent or more 
in global emissions relative to the year 2000 by 2050. 
Reduction commitments will likely need to be stricter 
in rich countries than in the developing world, 
because of differences in abilities to pay and historical 
responsibility for climate change. 
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To illustrate the magnitude of the challenge, 
consider halving Australia’s energy-related emissions 
by 2050 compared with 1990 levels (approximately –60 
per cent compared with 2000). If prompt policy action 
was taken and emissions peaked in 2012, then annual 
reductions of –3 per cent would be needed thereafter, 
compared with growth in the past two decades of about 
2 per cent a year on average. Delaying the peaking of 
emissions until 2020 would require reductions of close 
to –5 per cent per year later on. This is a relatively 
weak reduction scenario, compared to what may be 
needed to stabilise greenhouse gas concentrations in 
the atmosphere at acceptable levels. 
Achieving and sustaining ambitious policies 
that will deliver such reductions could be difficult 
politically in a purely domestic scheme. Each review 
of the policy could bring temptation to lessen ambition 
and to postpone stringent action. This in turn would 
affect expectations of future carbon prices and weaken 
incentives to invest in low-emission technology. 
International linking and trading
A straightforward way to commit to more sustained 
incentives is to link Australian emission trading 
comprehensively to other schemes internationally. 
The permit price in Australia is then equal with 
that internationally. As a relatively small country, 
Australia’s choice of target would affect international 
permit trade flows, but leave the permit price and 
the incentive to reduce emissions almost unchanged. 
To lower the carbon price in Australia would require 
opting out of the international system—a much bigger 
hurdle than just revising the target.
International emission trading also provides a 
way of enticing new participants into the scheme. 
Industrialising or developing countries could be 
drawn into the linked scheme through relatively 
generous initial targets. They would face the same 
marginal cost and incentive to abate, but sell freed-up 
permits to other countries. 
To be compatible with each other, national emission 
trading schemes need to be harmonised in many 
aspects. Perhaps the biggest obstacle to linking is 
the price cap—or ‘emission fee’—in the Australian 
proposals, especially in the report of the prime 
minister’s task group. This would create an upper limit 
on the permit price by way of the government issuing 
additional permits into the market at the predetermined 
threshold level. A price cap reduces the risk of a cost 
blow-out given uncertainty about abatement costs. In 
an internationally linked scheme, however, the level of a 
price cap would have to be the same between countries; 
otherwise emitters in ‘linked’ countries could comply 
with their obligations simply by purchasing permits 
originating in the country with the lowest threshold 
price, which would be unacceptable to governments. 
Post-2012 international climate policy
With the first commitment period to the Kyoto Protocol 
ending in 2012, negotiations about the next phase of 
international climate policy are getting under way 
and could formally be launched at the Bali UN climate 
conference in December. There is now broad support 
internationally for working toward a future climate 
treaty under the UN Convention on Climate Change, 
but it remains to be seen what shape it might take. 
Competing visions include a continuation of the 
Kyoto Protocol and a system based on pledges and 
reviews rather than emission targets. Despite the 
apparent dichotomy, there is room for convergence: 
a post-2012 treaty could take basic elements from 
the Kyoto Protocol, but offer much more flexibility 
and a broader range of commitments (Jotzo 2007). 
Targets could be indexed to economic growth, be 
made non-binding as an entry point for developing 
countries or apply only to specific sectors of economies 
that are not ready to commit to national targets. The 
Kyoto Protocol Clean Development Mechanism for 
developing countries could be expanded beyond 
individual projects to cover whole sectors or policies. 
Credit could be given to measures that are desirable 
but which do not result in readily quantifiable emission 
reductions, such as funding for research on future clean 
technologies or funding to avoid deforestation. 
International developments need to be taken 
into account in deciding Australia’s climate policy. 
As a relatively small economy, Australia’s biggest 
contribution could be by encouraging other countries 
to act. Effective domestic policies—including a well-
designed and ambitious emission trading scheme—
will be crucial in that effort. 
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